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ABSTRACT 
The  groposed DoD standard Common APSE Interface Set ( C A I S )  has been developed as 
a framework set of interfaces that will support the transportability and interOperAbility 
of tools in the support environments of the future. While the current CAIS versiori is a 
promising start  toward fulfilling those goals and current prototypes provide adequate 
testbeds for investigations in support of completing specifications for a ful l  CAIS, t h e r r  
are many reasons why the proposed CAIS might fail to become a usable product a111(1 
the foundation of next-generation (1990's) project support environments s u c h  a3 K A S A  ' Y  
Space Station software support environment. The most critical threats to the v ia t i i l i 1  y 
and acceptance of the CAIS include performance issues (especially in piggybnck(Sc1 
implementations), transportability, and security requirements . To make the situaiiorl 
worse, the solution to some of these threats appears to be a t  conflict with the  s o l u t i o i ~ ~  
to others. 
TRW's CAIS development is a risk-managed approach planned to gather Infornlat 1011 
uarly about critical threats, and, based on that information, to identify and pursuc r i l i k -  
reduction development approaches. This is an application of Barry Boehm's "Spiral  
Model" of the software devrloprnent process, which integrates risk marragerrient i n t o  a 
generalization of systems developmen t processes. Risk-managed tipproaches typically 
include prototyping to expedite acquisition of infoririation ir. critical risk areas. TI1 \i"? 
i r i i t i i i l  aqwwrrierit of r i q k q  led to n c.oriiprchcrr.qive drsign phase for the prototype t,pforca 
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coding based on two principal reasons: 
0 1. the  necessity to avoid a "narrow" prototype tha t  accomplished wrne 
objectives while impeding others (or at lcast to reduce auch conflicts In the 
initial implementation and to reduce and asse8a costa In expanding the 
prototype to serve broad risk-reduction objectivee), and 
2. incomplete information about how to accompllsh tha t  In a prototype (or 
even what the threats really were and hence what the objectives should be). 
This prototype design phase was the Erst traversal of the Spiral Model. T h e  near-term 
benefit of this approach is to direct initial prototyping activities toward are- with 
highest payoff in risk-reduction information while retaining compatibility with 
pursuance of other areas. The ultimate payoff of the T R W  npproach will not be in 
rapidness of prototype simulation of the initial CAIS, but  in gathering information for 
specification and implementation of a viable 1990's CAIS (and perhaps even putting the 
C N S  prototype on the direct evolutionary path toward such a production-quality 
implementation). 
0 
Following are some of the risk-reduction directions determined by the TRW {',AIS 
prototype design activities: 
0 Performance: a key fact is that the CAIS is more complex than typical 
1980's oper&!;ng systems, offering direct tool and user support  in m a n y  are- 
not well (or directly) supported in most operating systems (e.g., 
configuration management support, inter-program communication and 
synchronization, access :ontrol, etc.). Early intense effort is needed in such  
key area9 to develop efficient algorithms and/or architectures in these n o t  
.rcrweII-supported arells. Simulation htw been identified aa a time-asving 
approach to rrrsess performacte of newly developed CAIS algorithms or 
architectures without the complete expense of tool building or porting (and 
qorrlr . t , irr ie.u wit!iout completely implementing the CAIS algorithms). 
~ ( j ( j i t i o r i a I Iy ,  t tw tough goal of piggybacked implementations (atop existing 
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, 
operating systems) la crggru.vated by CAIS portability concerns 
0 TransportabIlIty of CAI3 ImplementatIonsi the TRW CAIS design is 
based on a mapping of CAIS functionality dlrectly to a machlne-Independent 
underlying model called the "tool portability layer". This means tha t  most 
of the CAIS functionality can be implemented without regard tu the 
undei-lying host. This approach isolates into the "inner portability layer" of 
the CAIS those functions that  are most host-dependent. This tlea in with 
the goal of efficiency by allowing development of hostdependent 
optlmizatlons in the inner layer, and hoseindependent higher-level 
optimizations in the outer tool portability layer. 
0 SecurItyt due to the time m d  expense of developing a certifiably secure 
CAIS (as on a bare machine), TRW's initial efforts will be investigations into 
using components from TRW's Army Secure Operating System (ASOS) 
project (scoped for A l )  89 a Trusted Computing Base upon which to 
implement the inner portability layer. This looks like a promising 
compromise between development costs of secure systems, and CAIS 
transportabiiity and performance goals (because of reuse of the tool 
portability implementation layer and its optimizations). 
As demonstrated in the list above, a risk-managed approach can find developrrieri . 
strategies which simriltaneously work toward solutions of the multiple critical threats to 
CAIS viability. A prototype implementation approach incorporating these is ongoing 
now, with il basic subset of the CAIS now implemented. Progress will be reviewed 
agains' the risk list later this year, a t  w6ich time risks may be re-assessed, new 
alternative approaches hypothesized, and new directions aelected based on information 
acquired in this phase of prototyping. This prototyping, risk re-assessment, a n d  
replanning will constiti1 tc another traversnl of the Spiral Model. 
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